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In this Public Policy Brief, Barry Bluestone and Teresa Ghilarducci argue
for the need to establish “wage insurance” in the current environment of
stagnating wages, increasing income instability, and rising adult poverty.
The War on Poverty has succeeded in reducing the poverty rate for
elderly Americans from 30 percent to 10.5 percent over the past three
decades. Nonelderly adults constitute an absolute majority (50.2 per-
cent) of all poor persons in the nation, up from 40.1 percent twenty-five
years ago. With the overall growth in the number of persons in poverty
in the United States from 25.4 million in 1970 to 38.1 million in 1994,
the number of poor nonelderly adults nearly doubled, from 10.4 million
to 19.1 million.
Bluestone and Ghilarducci note that essential components of a wage
insurance system already exist in the earned income tax credit (EITC)
and the minimum wage. But the EITC and the federal wage floor must
be seen as complements to one another, not substitutes for one another,
in order to meet important criteria for any insurance program: high tar-
get efficiency and minimal adverse behavioral effects. Properly used, the
EITC and the minimum wage fit together like finely cut jigsaw puzzle
pieces; the considerable strengths of the EITC offset weaknesses in the
minimum wage, while the minimum wage’s greatest benefits offset some
of the shortcomings of the EITC. 
The authors show that low income is being “democratized” as job insta-
bility i n c reases. Due in part to corporate downsizing, an increasing number
of once-secure working-class and middle-class families are experiencing
t e m p o r a ry or periodic povert y. Falling wages for at least the bottom 20
percent of the workforce and rising job and wage instability for much of
the middle class portend a society in which work no longer serves as an
e ffective guarantee against privation. Institutionalizing a form of wage
insurance based on the EITC and a rising minimum wage can help pro-
tect a large segment of workers in this economic environment.
The modest minimum wage increase to $5.15 recently passed by
Congress will raise the income of over 12 million workers who now earn
from $4.25 up to $5.15 per hour. Moreover, findings suggest that nearly 9
million workers currently earning between $5.15 and $6.14 per hour will
see their wages rise by an average of 10 percent when the $5.15 wage
floor goes into effect. This means that more than 21 million workers—
one out of six in the workforce—will see their wages improve as a result
of enacting the higher minimum wage. 
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t a rget eff i c i e n c y. More than 46 percent of the total tax credit goes to
families who are living under the official poverty line, and more than
two-thirds of the credit goes to families with income under $20,000. The
EITC has still another advantage, one that is often overlooked by both
its supporters and its detractors. It is a form of wage insurance for the
temporary poor in a time of job instability and earnings insecurity. In any
one year about one in six families is eligible for the tax credit, and over a
period of a decade nearly 40 percent of families will have a year or more
in which their wage income declines sufficiently for them to be eligible
for the EITC. 
Neither the minimum wage nor the EITC is by itself an ideal solution to
the wage poverty problem. Yet when the two are combined, the sum is
g reater than its parts. On three criteria (income adequacy, target eff i-
c i e n c y, and labor supply employment effects), the minimum wage is
weak. These are precisely the strengths of the EITC. On four other crite-
ria (labor demand, productivity enhancement, fiscal impact, and limited
moral hazard), the minimum wage is clearly the preferred program. What
makes the two fit together so well is that the existence of a higher mini-
mum wage actually reduces the negative productivity, fiscal impact, and
moral hazard effects of the EITC, while the EITC makes up for the weak
target efficiency and income adequacy of the minimum wage.
Bluestone and Ghilarducci argue for a comprehensive and coherent strate-
gy aimed at the working poor and those susceptible to highly fluctuating
incomes. Changes in the food stamp program enacted as part of the re c e n t
w e l f a re re f o rm legislation and proposed cuts in the EITC work in pre c i s e l y
the opposite direction. A cut of $23 billion in food stamp benefits between
1997 and 2002 and the increased FICA tax liability accompanying the
i n c rease in the federal minimum wage reduce the effective hike in the
wage floor from $0.90 to $0.73 per hour for nonimmigrants. For legal
immigrants working full-time, who will now be denied food stamps, the
lost benefit is more than double the earnings gain attributable to the
i n c rease in the minimum wage. In addition, the congressional re s o l u t i o n
for balancing the federal budget by 2002 includes an $18.5 billion re d u c-
tion in EITC benefits. These changes undermine the objective of assuring
that families that work will not be mired in poverty and dependency.
Wage insurance becomes more necessary in a political climate of welfare
overhauling and budget cutting that gives with one hand while taking
with the other. Eff o rts to improve education and training pro g r a m s ,
expand community development efforts, promote unionization, and nar-
row the gender pay gap can reduce the long-run cost of wage insurance. 
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federal minimum wage, the debate over the virtues and vices of a mini-
mum wage continues. The arduous political battle over the 90-cent-an-
hour boost in the minimum wage was passionately fought on grounds of
both efficiency and ethics, and economists are still arguing about the
wage floor’s target efficiency (e.g., do teenagers and the nonpoor benefit
too much?) and employment effects (e.g., does an increase in the wage
floor result in job displacement?). 
Congress has also scrutinized the earned income tax credit (EITC). The
EITC was at one time championed as the best antipoverty program, but
it is now criticized (even by some former supporters) for waste, fraud,
abuse, and error. Proponents of the EITC concede that it is an imperfect
program, but still believe that the EITC’s design and intent—to help the
working poor escape poverty and dependency—make it a valuable pro-
gram that must be preserved. Indeed, many observers argue for reinforce-
ment of the EITC in light of the recent welfare reform legislation that
will flood the low-wage labor market with millions of entrants.
B a rry Bluestone and Te resa Ghilarducci recommend a compre h e n s i v e
a p p roach to help the working poor flee the scourge of povert y. Their
a p p roach is founded on the notion that an individual who works full-
time and year-round should be assured an above-poverty standard of liv-
ing. The main tenets of the wage insurance plan—modeled on the
success of social insurance programs such as Social Security and the state
unemployment insurance pro g r a m s — a re the minimum wage and the
EITC. The authors demonstrate how the two mutually supportive pro-
grams work in tandem to help low-wage workers; the advantages of the
7 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
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minimum wage offset and ameliorate the disadvantages of the EITC, and
vice versa. Together, the two policies are effective tools in helping low-
wage workers avoid poverty in the current period of employment and
earnings instability and economic insecurity. 
The present drive to “reform” welfare emphasizes work requirements and
time limits on benefits for able-bodied adults. Bluestone and
Ghilarducci’s research lends some support for measures that will increase
work incentives and facilitate the transition from welfare to work.
However, the authors conclude that indexing the minimum wage (cur-
rently $5.15 per hour) and full funding of the EITC are the building
blocks for a comprehensive wage insurance strategy to ensure that work
pays in America.
This Public Policy Brief makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing
debates over the minimum wage, welfare policy, and the nature of the
public sector’s role in providing a social safety net.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
Executive Director
November 1996
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Fifty years ago, passage of the Employment Act of 1946 committed the
federal government to pursue economic policies that would assure maxi-
mum employment consistent with reasonable price stability. The framers
of the act assumed that maintaining a low unemployment rate was the
necessary and, for all practical purposes, sufficient condition for guaran-
teeing an adequate standard of living for any family in which one or
m o re members were gainfully employed. They assumed that with full
employment rising real wages would reduce, if not totally eradicate,
poverty among working families. 
Employed workers were distinguished from those out of work or unable
to work. For the unemployed, the disabled, the elderly, and dependent
children, “social insurance” was envisioned as a substitute for a family’s
“living wage.” Since the 1930s many programs—state unemployment
insurance; Old Age, Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance (OASD-
HI, more commonly known as Social Security); Supplemental Security
Income (SSI); Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); hous-
ing subsidies; and nutrition programs, such as Food Stamps and the
Women, Infants, and Children food supplement (WIC)—have become
i m p o rtant threads in the American tapestry of social insurance. The
overall system is aptly named “social” because it provides universal cov-
erage and “insurance” because it is constructed to protect individuals and
families against the temporary or, for some, permanent risks of not work-
ing and being poor. The framers of the act assumed that the labor market
would take care of those who can work; social insurance was to care for
those who cannot.
Wage Insurance for the 
Working Poor 
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in limiting the spread of povert y. Conservative rhetoric notwithstanding,
the War on Povert y, begun in the mid 1960s, has had its share of major
victories. None is more striking than the sharp decline in poverty among
the elderly. In 1967 nearly 30 percent of older Americans were living on
an income below the official poverty line. Tod a y, only 10.5 percent are
p o o r, thanks to the expansion of Social Security and Medicare. Danziger
and We i n b e rg (1992) estimate that without these universal transfer pro-
grams an absolute majority (51 percent) of people in the nation over 65
would be living in povert y. Programs for the nonelderly have not been as
successful. Nonetheless (and contrary to the widespread criticism of
AFDC), Mishel and Bernstein (1994) estimate that without AFDC,
Social Security, nutrition programs, and housing benefits the incidence of
p o v e rty among persons in female-headed families with related childre n
under age 18 would be 51.7 percent instead of the 33.7 percent it is with
those programs (Primus, Port e r, Ditto, and Kent 1996).
The success of Social Security and other social insurance programs has
dramatically changed poverty’s demographic profile, as shown in Table 1.
In 1970 children under 18 made up about 41 percent of the poor, and
the elderly accounted for about 19 percent. In 1994 children made up
40.2 percent of the poor, but the elderly accounted for only 9.6 percent.
Nonelderly adults constituted an absolute majority (50.2 percent) of all
poor persons in the nation in 1994, up from 40.1 percent in 1970. While
the total number of persons in poverty in the United States grew from
Making Work Pay
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Table 1 Demographics of American Poverty Status by Age
Age
Under 18 Age 18–64 65 and Over Total 
1970
Number 10,440,000 10,187,000 4,793,000 25,420,000
Percent a 41.1 40.1 18.9 100
1994
Number 15,289,000 19,107,000 3,663,000 38,059,000
Percent 40.2 50.2 9.6  100
a Percents do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey.
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25.4 million in 1970 to 38.1 million in 1994, the number of poor
nonelderly adults nearly doubled, from 10.2 million to 19.1 million.1
Put another way, more than 70 percent of the net increase in poverty has
been among those whom we normally think of as at work or available for
work. This may be the first time in the history of any country—certainly
the first time since the era of Charles Dickens—when a majority of the
poor are not the young, the old, and the infirm, but people who are of
working age and are able to work. In spite of the creation of 16.6 million
jobs over the past decade, working poverty is hardly disappearing. The
implicit standard-of-living promise of the 1946 Employment Act has not
been realized for vast numbers of Americans who work.2
B u r k h a u s e r, Couch, and Glenn (1995) note that in 1989 three out of four
p o v e rty households had one or more workers. Nearly 70 percent of all poor
individuals between the ages of 25 and 54 did some paid work during the
y e a r. Three out of every ten worked year- round, full-time. Nowhere among
the poor is work more important than in families with both a mother and
a father present. In 1989 in more than 55 percent of poor, marr i e d - c o u p l e
households with children, at least one of the adults  had a full-time job for
some period. That percentage was up from 47 percent in 1975.3
This turn of events could not have been foreseen by the framers of the
original Employment Act. Only with the advantage of hindsight and an
avalanche of wage and income data can we recognize the economic
t rends that have undermined full employment as the means by which
p o v e rty would be eliminated among the “gainfully employed.” These
trends will not easily be reversed. For this reason, it now appears appro-
priate to consider “wage insurance” for workers who earn poverty wages.
An existing program—the earned income tax credit (EITC)—is a strong
candidate for this role. But, as we shall demonstrate, it must be tied to
another existing program—the minimum wage—in order to deal with
two serious problems that any insurance program must confront: target
efficiency and unintended adverse behavioral effects, or “moral hazard.”
Properly used, the EITC and the minimum wage fit together like well-
cut jigsaw puzzle pieces and have the potential to fill much of the wage
gap of the working poor. Strengths of the EITC offset weaknesses of the
minimum wage, and the minimum wage’s greatest benefits offset some of
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ance is in place, but changes will be required. The newly passed mini-
mum wage of $5.15 per hour by itself is too low to do much about wage
poverty, and the EITC is expensive and will become even more costly to
taxpayers over time, especially if the minimum wage is not indexed
annually or at least biennially to reflect rising living costs.
The value of linking these two programs has not been obvious, at least
within political circles. In 1995 the majority leadership in both the
House and the Senate condemned the minimum wage as a job destruc-
tion program. Along with the usual arsenal of arguments against the fed-
eral wage floor, minimum wage opponents made the point that with the
expansion of the EITC program the minimum wage was no longer neces-
sary. As we shall demonstrate in this paper, the EITC requires a higher
minimum wage if wage poverty is to be challenged effectively and if the
EITC is to be prevented from becoming a subsidy to employers rather
than to workers and an ever-larger burden on taxpayers. Without an ade-
quate indexed minimum wage, the EITC tends to “socialize” wages. The
minimum wage “privatizes” them.
Wage and Income Trends That Foster Working Povert y
The labor market trends that make a full-scale “wage insurance” plan
n e c e s s a ry are now well established. Average wages have been falling,
family incomes have stagnated, and distribution of both earnings and
household incomes has become vastly more unequal over the past two
decades. Between the end of World War II and 1973 inflation-adjusted
average weekly wages for nonsupervisory employees rose by 60 percent,
and real median family income, boosted by the growth in female labor
force participation, doubled. Those at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion saw their incomes rise slightly more than those at the top. The
Employment Act was well on its way to fulfilling its promise of adequate
income for those at work.
Such a benign climate of rising income, more equally shared, came to an
end in 1973. Since then, average weekly wages for production and non-
s u p e rv i s o ry employees have fallen by nearly 20 perc e n t .4 Even with
higher labor force participation, real median family income in 1994 was
Making Work Pay
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income distribution increased dramatically. The U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1996) reported that mean real income for the top quintile of the
income distribution rose by 24 percent, while income for the bottom
quintile, where most of the poor are located, fell by 7 percent.
T h e re are a host of reasons for the decline in the standard of living
among those at the low end of the income distribution. Gary Burt l e s s
(1996) has parsed out the sources of income decline for the bottom quin-
tile. Between 1973 and 1993 the average income per capita available to
this low-income group fell by nearly 23 perc e n t — f rom $5,867 to $4,532
(in 1993 dollars).5 Cutbacks in AFDC and private pensions caused a
small amount of the decline. However, no less than 60 percent of the
total loss in income was due to the declining labor market earnings of
household members as a consequence of falling wages or reduced employ-
ment or both. These results confirm earlier studies of the reasons families
end up poor. After analyzing the impact of low skills, bad work habits,
single pare n t h o od, illness, and age, Rebecca Blank (1991) found that low
e a rnings has been the most cogent explanation for the rise in povert y
even during periods of healthy aggregate economic gro w t h .
Families permanently trapped on the lowest rungs of the income ladder
are not the only families in economic trouble. Low income is becoming
“democratized” as job instability increases. Corporate downsizing at all
levels of the firm is taking its toll, causing an increasing number of once
s e c u re working-class and middle-class families to experience temporary
or periodic poverty as the result of job loss.
Stephen Rose (1995b) was one of the first to quantify this trend. His
re s e a rch shows a sharp decline in employment “stability” among prime-
age workers. Rose found that the degree of occupational stability
remained unchanged between the 1970s and the 1980s; the probability of
a male worker’s changing occupations during the 1980s was not much
g reater than during the 1970s. But job stability declined sharply. In the
1970s, 67 percent of men had a “strong attachment” to their firm. They
worked full-time for the same company for at least 8 out of 10 years dur-
ing the decade. The percentage of male workers with such strong com-
pany affiliation fell to only 52 percent in the 1980s. Weak attachment,
on the other hand, defined as working for the same employer for no more
Wage Insurance for the Working Poor
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workers to 24 percent. Rose found that such employment turnover leads
to disrupted career paths, in turn resulting in lower average earnings. Job
loss plunges a not-insignificant number of families into the ranks of the
poor or near poor, at least temporarily.
What these statistics suggest is that poverty has become part of the very
fabric of the American labor market. Falling wages for at least the bot-
tom 20 percent of the workforce and rising job and wage instability for
much of the middle class portend a society in which work no longer
serves as an effective guarantee against privation.
Combating Working Poverty by Raising the Minimum Wa g e
“Making work pay” has been the key objective of two federal policies.
For more than half a century the federal government has attempted to
prop up earnings by regulating minimum wages, and since the middle of
the 1970s it has improved the incomes of working families with children
by offering a wage subsidy, the EITC. The two policies combat low earn-
ings in very different ways. 
Well before the passage of the 1946 Employment Act, the government
recognized the need for putting a floor under wages. In Franklin
Roosevelt’s second inaugural address, in 1937, he called on Congress to
help the one-third of Americans who were “ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-
nourished.” The Fair Labor Standards Act set a minimum wage in 1938.
Its purpose, as stated in the legislation’s preamble, was the “maintenance
of the minimum standard of living necessary for the health, eff i c i e n c y,
and general well-being of workers.” The original minimum wage of $0.25
per hour improved wages, but was sufficient to raise a worker’s earnings
only to the point at which the earnings would, using today’s standards,
support a family of three at 46 percent of the poverty line. 
After World War II the federal government raised the minimum wage
re g u l a r l y. Between 1950 and 1991 Congress raised the wage floor 14
times. As shown in Table 2, the real value of the minimum reached its
high point in 1968 when, at $1.60 per hour, it represented, on a full-year,
full-time basis, 118 percent of the poverty wage for a family of three. 
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the rising cost of living. By 1995 a full-time worker with a minimum-
wage job was able to earn enough to supply only 72 percent of the
income needs of a three-person family living at the poverty level.
According to Levy Institute Research Associate Edward N. Wolff, if the
minimum wage had kept up with inflation since 1965, the current wages
earned by American workers would place 30 percent of them below that
income level. As shown in Figure 1, the real value of the minimum wage
has declined since 1968. Even if the new minimum wage of $5.15 per
hour had been in place in 1994, it would have already been nearly $1.15
less than its 1968 real value. If a family of three were to rely on the mini-
mum wage alone to keep from falling below the poverty line, the mini-
mum would have to be $6.08 per hour. For a family of four, it would have
to be $7.80.
Still, even the modest increase in the wage floor promoted by the
Clinton administration and passed by the Congress will have a substan-
tial impact, since real wages have fallen so far during the past 20 years.
According to Mishel, Bernstein, and Rasell (1995), raising the minimum
wage to $5.15 per hour from $4.25 will raise the income of over 12 mil-
lion workers who now earn from $4.25 up to $5.15 per hour.
Wage Insurance for the Working Poor
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Table 2  Full-Time, Full-Year Work
at the Minimum Wage as a Percent of
P o v e rty Income for a Family of Three 
Year Percent
1938 46
1945 57
1950 80
1956 94
1961 98
1967 107
1968 118
1975 100
1980 96
1987 78
1991 74
1995 72
Source: Economic Policy Institute.
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firms typically maintain wage differentials between groups of workers by
establishing wage contours. William Spriggs and Bruce Klein (1994)
estimated the nation’s “low-wage contour” in order to measure how
many people working just above the statutory minimum wage would
benefit from a wage hike. They found that nearly 9 million workers
currently earning between $5.15 and $6.14 per hour will see their wages
rise by an average of 10 percent when the Clinton $5.15 wage floor goes
into effect. To g e t h e r, then, more than 21 million workers—one out of
six in the U.S. workforce—will see their wages improve over the next
two years as a result of enacting the $5.15 minimum wage. 
We know who these minimum-wage workers are. Mishel, Bernstein, and
Rasell (1995) show that three-fourths are adults; only about one-fourth
are teenagers. Nearly three-fifths are women, whose families are dispro-
portionately in poverty. Over half are found in the poorest 20 percent of
all families. Well over two-thirds work in retail trade and services (a full
41 percent in food service alone). Only one-tenth work in manufactur-
ing, where the threat of low-wage international competition may
increase if the minimum is raised.
As public policy, the minimum wage has at least four things to re c o m-
mend it. First and foremost, it increases workers’ earnings without placing
Making Work Pay
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Figure 1  Real Value of Minimum Wage
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
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a burden on the taxpayer. It adds nothing to the federal deficit. In fact, it
likely decreases the deficit by boosting income tax revenue and re d u c i n g
w e l f a re payments.6 Second, it provides increased income to workers who
do not qualify for government transfer programs or tax credits. Third, it is
an incentive to work in the “aboveground” economy rather than in the
“ u n d e rg round” economy, where wages are often higher than the federal
minimum. Fourth, and by no means least, it may lead to higher prod u c-
tivity in the economy. At current wage levels there is little incentive for
low-wage employers to introduce new technology or find other ways to
boost the output of their workforce. According to Robert Gordon (1996),
if firms were re q u i red to pay a higher wage, they would have an incentive
to find ways to use their workers more eff e c t i v e l y.
S h o rtcomings of the Minimum Wage as a Strategy for
Reducing Povert y
These advantages notwithstanding, the minimum wage is not a perfect
remedy for low earnings. It has been criticized on two grounds. First, it is
claimed that it induces unemployment, especially among younger work-
ers with limited skills. Second, it is asserted that it has poor “target effi-
ciency,” that is, it helps many workers in nonpoor families and provides
only limited earnings assistance to the truly needy. It turns out that the
first of these criticisms—the traditional economic argument that raising
the wage floor hurts the very workers it is supposed to help—can no
longer be re g a rded as credible for modest increases. The second, how-
ever, is. The minimum wage may raise earnings, but its impact on pulling
families out of poverty is quite limited.
Unemployment Eff e c t s
A c c o rding to an article in The New York Times by David Rosenbaum
(1996), only 22 percent of the public believe that an increase in the
minimum wage will lead to job loss, yet a recent survey of the
American Economic Association shows 77 percent of economists
expect that such an increase will lead to higher unemployment. This is
no surprise; their conclusion is based on the standard textbook mod e l
of wage equilibrium. If minimum wages do not cause unemployment, all
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rewritten. 
B rown, Gilro y, and Kohen (1982) suggest that the Minimum Wa g e
Commission of 1981 provided the rule of thumb used by mainstre a m
analysts today to calculate the likely negative employment impact of
raising the national wage floor. The commission employed teams of
economists to synthesize all the available minimum wage studies and
simultaneously conducted its own re s e a rch into the matter. Te e n a g e r s ,
the commission concluded, bear the brunt of minimum wage-induced
job loss, being the least skilled and most expendable in the labor pool.
The commission concluded that a 10.0 percent increase in the federal
wage floor typically leads to a 1.0 to 3.0 percent cut in teenage employ-
ment. Among adults, the effect was found to be substantially weaker, but
still statistically significant, in the range of 0.3 to 0.7 percent. Empirical
research since 1981 has appeared to confirm the commission’s concern,
but generally finds a teenage effect no greater than 1.0 percent.
Neither the commission nor the economists who have found a negative
employment effect have ever denied that many workers benefit from a
hike in the legal minimum. But, taking a page from Dostoevsky’s T h e
Brothers Karamazov, they have argued that it is economically and ethi-
cally questionable to force some teenage workers out of their jobs in
order to raise wages marginally for others. This is particularly true, argue
opponents of the minimum wage, because early work history is vital for
future labor market success. Michael Cox (1996) stated that sentencing
teenagers to joblessness not only hurts them when they are young, but
will continue to harm them the rest of their lives. 
In recent years, however, a growing number of economists have taken
issue both theoretically and empirically with the notion that a minimum
wage necessarily reduces employment. In cases of imperfect competi-
tion—especially when workers are not fully mobile, as in cases of a
monopsony—employment may remain the same or actually rise after the
wage floor is raised.7 If the firm has some oligopolistic power in the prod-
uct market, the wage may rise with no change in prices or employment
levels. And in pure monopoly cases, the firm can absorb the wage
increases in lower profits without reducing employment at all. 
Making Work Pay
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The theory of the monopsony case was first rigorously laid out by Milton
Friedman (1967), but Friedman concluded that in the real world it was
unlikely that the monopsony case would ever be found in the low-wage
labor market, which he saw as fully competitive in terms of both labor
supply and labor demand. Empirical studies by David Card and Alan
Krueger (1995) now suggest that the monopsony model may not be as
i rrelevant for the low-wage market as Friedman conjectured. In their
micro studies, Card and Krueger demonstrate that in the real world of
fast-food restaurants and other low-wage employers, modest increases in
minimum wages have virtually no negative impact on employment lev-
els. Their counterintuitive results have brought a storm of criticism from
traditional economists, but none of Card and Krueger’s detractors have
fundamentally undermined their findings. Essentially, there is sufficient
slack in the relationship between wages and employment levels, espe-
cially in industries not subject to international low-wage competition, so
that employers absorb the higher minimum wage by lowering pro f i t s
slightly rather than by laying off workers.
The Card and Krueger studies served well to weaken some initial con-
gressional opposition to the new minimum wage. It turns out, however,
that even if their results were ignored and the critics’ estimates of an
unemployment effect accepted, the purported job loss would not consti-
tute a case for rejecting a higher minimum wage. The reason is that vir-
tually every low-wage worker benefits from a higher minimum wage, even
if there is an aggregate labor displacement effect. The “Dostoevsky” criti-
cism is irrelevant because in the real labor market we do not sacrifice
some workers’ jobs to boost other workers’ earnings. Instead, because of
the high job turnover rate among teenagers in particular and low-wage
workers in general, no single individual bears the full burden of unem-
ployment.8 Those who benefit from the higher federal wage floor share
both the higher wages and a portion of any induced unemployment. In
the case of the new minimum, the typical working teenager will see a 21
p e rcent increase in wages and a 6 percent decline in annual hours
worked, if there is job displacement as severe as early estimates make it
out to be. One presumes few teenage beneficiaries would vote against a
wage-job displacement deal that involves a 15 percent annual income
increase. For adults affected by the new minimum, the same 21 percent
wage increase is offset by a loss of no more than 1.5 percent in annual
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hours worked, hardly a dent in their improved economic condition. This
should vindicate the minimum wage, even for someone who does not
buy the Card and Krueger results.
Ta rget Efficiency 
Still, there is another criticism that makes the minimum wage less than
ideal as an antipoverty remedy. It concerns what economists call “target
e ff i c i e n c y.” Only a small pro p o rtion of the poor benefit directly fro m
increasing the wage floor, despite the fact that nearly 75 percent of poor
households have someone who works. According to estimates by
B u r k h a u s e r, Couch, and Glenn (1995), only about 17 percent of the
workers in poor households in 1991 were in jobs paying below what will
now be the statutory minimum of $5.15 per hour. The other 83 percent
of working-poor households will not be helped, since their working
members already earn wages above this level. As noted earlier, the feder-
al wage floor would have to be $7.80 per hour for a full-time worker to
earn enough to raise a family of four above the poverty line ($15,600 for
2,000 hours). Hence, most workers in poor families fall into a “dead
m a n ’s zone.” The Clinton minimum wage is below what they are cur-
rently making, but their pay is not sufficient, even on a full-time, full-
year basis, to catapult their families out of poverty.9
Combating Working Poverty with the EITC
To assist the most disadvantaged of the working poor, a program with
better target efficiency is needed. Here is where the earned income tax
c redit comes in. First enacted in 1975, the EITC is a refundable tax
credit aimed directly at helping poor working families with children. I t s
original intent was to offset a portion of the payroll tax liability of low-
income families, thus reducing the re g ressivity of federal taxes at the
bottom of the income distribution. Being refundable, it has aspects of a
“negative income tax.” If the credit due a family is greater than its fed-
eral tax liability, the IRS remits the balance to the family. 
The way the EITC works in principle is quite simple (see Figure 2). Ta k e
a working family with one earner and two or more children. Under the
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for every dollar earned up to $8,890 (indicated as 40 percent in Figure 2).
Hence, the EITC provides a maximum benefit of $3,556 (0.40 x $8,890).
When that family files its Form 1040 and its total taxes are figured, the
tax liability is reduced by this amount. A check is sent to the family for
the diff e rence between what it owes and the amount of the credit. The
family is eligible for the maximum credit until its total earnings fro m
work reach $11,610. After that, the credit declines by $0.21 (–21.06 per-
cent) per dollar of earnings. The credit vanishes altogether when the
f a m i l y ’s earnings exceed $28,495. There is a separate, lower schedule for
working families with one child. Under that schedule, the maximum
c redit is $2,152, and the credit “vanishes” at $25,078. The EITC’s gre a t-
est advantage from the perspective of battling poverty is its target eff i-
c i e n c y. According to Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn (1995), more than
46 percent of the pro g r a m ’s total tax credit goes to families who are living
under the official poverty line, and 63 percent goes to poor and near- p o o r
families, those with incomes no more than 1.5 times the poverty line. 
Only about 15 percent goes to families with incomes 3 times the poverty
line or greater (families who have relatively high incomes, but re c e i v e
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Figure 2   EITC Schedule, 1996 Values
Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, “Earned Income Tax Credit: Rewarding Work for
Working Families,” June 5, 1995.
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only a portion of their income from wages). The U.S. Tre a s u ry
D e p a rtment estimates that in 1996 more than two-thirds of the cre d i t
will go to families with income under $20,000. Hence the credit directly
a ffects millions of poor families, including the millions in the “dead
man’s zone” who are not helped by the minimum wage. For a family of
four with one earner making $7.00 per hour and working 1,500 hours per
year, the EITC fills nearly 80 percent of its “poverty gap,” the difference
between after-tax earnings and the poverty line.
The EITC has another great advantage, often overlooked by both its sup-
p o rters and its detractors. It is a form of wage insurance for the temporary
poor in an era of job instability and earnings insecurity. Stephen Rose
(1995b), reprising the method he developed to study strong and weak job
attachment, estimated how many families would be eligible for the EITC
at least 1 year in 10. The answer is a striking 39 percent. In any single
year about 1 in 6 families is eligible for the tax credit, but over a decade,
nearly 2 out of 5 families will have a year or more in which their wage
income declines sufficiently for them to be eligible for the EITC. Rose
finds that 30 percent of all families with a male head of household and 46
p e rcent of families with a female head are eligible in at least 1 year in 10.
The EITC proves particularly useful for younger families, those hardest
hit by the falling average wage rates. More than half of families headed
by individuals younger than age 36 can benefit from the credit at least
some time in a 10-year period. The tax credit may not do anything to
reduce the threat of corporate downsizing, but it does help many of its
victims. The EITC is life support for the permanent low-wage worker
and it is earnings insurance for the middle class.
S h o rtcomings of the EITC as a Strategy for 
Reducing Povert y
However good its target efficiency, the EITC does have pitfalls. For one
thing, it is of no help to unrelated individuals and childless couples. The
maximum benefit they can receive is $324 per year.
An even greater disadvantage, at least politically, is that the EITC is
expensive from the perspective of the taxpayer. This year the EITC will
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jected to rise with population growth to $30 billion by the year 2000. Its
expense is one of the reasons the Republicans, in their zealous attempt
to balance the budget by 2002, have targeted EITC for significant cuts
despite their previous enthusiastic support for it.
A third problem—one that is plaguing all income support programs fro m
agricultural subsidies to tax deductions—is that the EITC is subject to
abuse. Until administrative changes were made in the program, first in
1991 and again in 1995, the “error rate” (which includes waste, fraud,
abuse, and error) for the credit was found to be extremely high relative to
other IRS provisions. Some families were receiving the credit when they
w e re ineligible; others were receiving more credit than they were legally
p e rmitted; still others were receiving less. Some of the errors were due to
a rcane IRS rules re g a rding household filing status, a fault that has been
re p a i red. The error rate was also reduced by instituting the practice of
c ross-checking tax re t u rns with Social Security earnings re c o rd s .
Nonetheless, since there is benefit to be gained from overstating one’s
income at very low earnings to move up toward the maximum credit on
the EITC schedule and there is benefit to be gained from understating
income at higher earnings levels to retain the maximum tax credit, there
will always be some enforcement issue needing attention—even if it pre-
sents the IRS with nowhere near the headache of policing tax compliance
among the rich.
The most serious problem with the EITC, however, involves “moral haz-
a rd”—the possibility that merely offering insurance leads to adverse
behavior on the part of the insured or other actors. For example, people
with theft insurance may become less conscientious about locking their
house. In the case of the EITC, the moral hazard is often referred to as
the “Speenhamland” effect. The EITC not only subsidizes workers,
which was its initial intent; it may subsidize low-wage employers, which
was not its objective. It permits employers to keep wages low while rely-
ing on the federal government to help workers make up the difference
between substandard earnings and something approaching a living wage.
The British learned this lesson two centuries ago when they imposed an
equivalent of the EITC in the form of the infamous Speenhamland pro-
visions. Introduced during the first decades of the industrial revolution,
the Speenhamland laws provided benefits to workers to keep them from
Wage Insurance for the Working Poor
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drive down wages and have the government pick up the tab for their
employees. By the early 1800s the Speenhamland laws were bankrupting
local treasuries, and they were repealed. Outdoor relief was also repealed
and the workhouse was introduced. 
Because the EITC is an implicit subsidy to employers, the credit has yet a
fifth shortcoming: it may have an adverse effect on prod u c t i v i t y. A wage
subsidy tends to reduce the incentive for investment in new technology
and capital. If an employer can obtain labor for $0.80 on the dollar, why
invest in labor-saving technology?
F i n a l l y, because of the subsidy schedule in the EITC, there is an incentive
for some workers to increase their work eff o rt, but a disincentive for oth-
ers. Those whose earnings place them under the maximum EITC benefit
have a strong monetary incentive to increase their work eff o rt as long as
that eff o rt does not place them on the downward-sloping section of the
benefit schedule (see Figure 2). In 1996 a worker with two childre n
employed in a minimum-wage job earned $4.25 per hour before counting
the EITC credit. At a 40 percent subsidy rate, the value of an additional
hour of work is effectively $5.95 (1.4 x $4.25). As such, on this upward -
sloping part of the EITC schedule, there is an EITC-induced incentive to
i n c rease work eff o rt. From a social policy perspective, this is good news. 
H o w e v e r, as annual wages increase, workers reach the downward - s l o p i n g
section of the schedule and face a stiff tax rate when they undertake addi-
tional work. Above the maximum benefit level, an additional hour of
work reduces the subsidy by $0.21 for every additional dollar earned (for
workers with two children or more). In this case, an additional hour of
work at, say, $8.00 per hour is worth only $6.32 because of the consequent
reduction in the EITC subsidy. Adding the income tax rate of 14.0 perc e n t
on the extra hour of work and the employee’s share of Social Security
taxes (7.65 percent), the effective marginal tax rate on that added hour of
work is more than 42.0 percent—steeper than the top income tax rate on
the very richest Americans and perhaps sufficiently high to dissuade such
workers from taking on that additional employment.1 0
How large is the net aggregate impact on work eff o rt of the EITC likely to
be? A comprehensive General Accounting Office (GAO) re p o rt in 1993
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p rovides such an estimate, based on extrapolations from negative income
tax (NIT) experiments carried out in the 1970s in Seattle and Denver on
the impact of various tax rates on welfare payments. Five thousand families
in Denver and Seattle were split into two groups. Families in one gro u p
w e re given a guaranteed income (instead of welfare) of $4,800. As their
income went up, they gradually lost the guarantee. The phase-out was 50
p e rcent, so that a family with a $9,600 income received no grant. Families
in the other group received no grant. As theory predicts, individuals who
received the grant worked less than individuals who did not. Single moth-
ers and wives reduced their hours of work by 23.0 and 20.7 percent re s p e c-
t i v e l y. Men reduced their hours of work, on average, by 12.5 percent. 
The GAO argues that the NIT experiments help predict the effect of
the EITC because both involve a phase-out range and both pertain to
low-income people. But because of a substantially lower phase-out rate
under the EITC than in the NIT experiments and because of the posi-
tive subsidy rate for the lowest wage earners, the estimated impact on
labor supply is much lower for the EITC. The GAO’s best estimate is
that the EITC reduces work eff o rt by as little as 1 percent, or an average
of 24 hours a year, and by no more than 3 percent, or an average of 34
hours. Other re s e a rch, including that of John Scholz (1995), suggests a
small positive effect on labor market participation since the EITC
induces some individuals to enter the labor force who would not other-
wise do so. On net, then, at worst it is likely that the EITC has a small
adverse effect on work eff o rt .
Building an Adequate, Effective, and Efficient “Wa g e
Insurance” Pro g r a m
It should be clear by now that neither the minimum wage nor the EITC
is an ideal solution to the wage poverty problem. Yet when the two are
combined, the sum is greater than its parts. Table 3 summarizes the
s t rengths and weaknesses of the two programs. Note the symmetry
between them. 
On three criteria—income adequacy, target efficiency, and labor demand
employment effects—the minimum wage is weak. These are pre c i s e l y
the strengths of the EITC. On four other criteria—labor supply, 
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minimum wage is clearly the preferred program. What makes the two fit
together so well is that the existence of a higher minimum wage actually
reduces the negative productivity effect, fiscal impact, and moral hazard
of the EITC, while the EITC makes up for the weak target efficiency and
income adequacy of the minimum wage. Clearly, the combination of the
two makes for good antipoverty policy, especially in an era in which the
majority of poor people are working-age adults and job insecurity is on
the rise. (See the appendix for estimates of how much the increase in the
minimum wage to $5.15 per hour in tandem with the current EITC will
help low-income families.) 
In a recent paper Robert Greenstein (1996) included the value of food
stamps in projecting the minimum wage that would be necessary to pull a
family of four to the official poverty line in the year 1998, by which time
the full Clinton increase in the minimum wage will have gone into eff e c t .
Table 4 shows his estimates for a family with one full-time earner (40 hours
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Table 4  How the Minimum Wage, EITC, and Food Stamps 
Combined Bring a Family of Four Almost to the Poverty Line
Poverty line $16,997
Minimum wage earnings (2,000 hr at $5.15/hr) 10,300
Payroll (FICA) tax –788
EITC 3,696
Food stamps 3,760
Total $16,968
Source: Adapted from Robert Greenstein, Raising Families with a Full-Time Worker 
Out of Poverty: The Role of an Increase in the Minimum Wage (Washington, D.C.: 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1996).
Table 3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Minimum Wage and the EITC
Attributes of Good Social Insurance Minimum Wage EITC
Income adequacy – +
Target efficiency – +
Employment effects (labor demand) – +
Employment effects (labor supply) + –
Productivity enhancement + –
Fiscal impact + –
Limited moral hazard +  –
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EITC credit adjusted for inflation. It turns out the Clinton minimum of
$5.15 just does the trick, with a few cents to spare. This hypothetical family
with earnings of $10,300 ends up just below the poverty line of $16,997 as a
result of nearly equal amounts of EITC and food stamps. Note, again, that
it is a combination of federal programs that elevates family income.
Putting Wage Insurance on a Permanent Footing
By assembling a variety of federal programs in a package of wage insur-
ance benefits, it is possible to lift most families with working members
above the poverty line. But over time families will slide down the
income ladder again unless the dollar value of the components of the
insurance scheme is maintained or enhanced. Under current law the
minimum wage is raised only by explicit legislative action, and in recent
years it has been a herculean task to get Congress to move on each mini-
mum wage measure. Thus inflation erodes the value of the wage floor in
between legislative efforts. Given that the EITC is indexed to inflation,
over time the EITC is forced to take on a greater share of the wage insur-
ance burden as the value of the wage floor declines. 
To remedy this problem, the minimum wage should be indexed. This
could be done by boosting the wage floor annually by the growth rate of
nominal average hourly wages for production and nonsuperv i s o ry
employees. If indexing had been instituted in 1991, when the minimum
wage was raised to $4.25, the wage floor would have reached $4.84 today
without the need for legislative action. Given expected increases in the
nominal average hourly wage, the minimum wage would have reached
$5.14 in 1998, just shortly after the full $5.15 Clinton minimum is
scheduled to go into effect. If the minimum wage is indexed to average
wages, the lowest-paid workers will at least keep pace with other work-
ers, limiting the growth in earnings inequality. If the tax indexing of
EITC is maintained, family incomes will continue to be at least partially
insured against rising costs.
Such a long-run approach to wage insurance may re q u i re a major political
e ff o rt, particularly because all of the elements of the scheme come under
legislative attack period i c a l l y. The We l f a re Reform Bill passed this year in
Wage Insurance for the Working Poor
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C o n g ress and signed by the president includes $23 billion in food stamp
reductions between 1997 and 2002, amounting to an 18 percent cut in
recipient benefits. By far the hardest hit will be legal immigrants, most of
whom will lose their eligibility for food stamps when the welfare re f o rm
bill goes into effect. For legal immigrant families whose income comes
solely from the earnings of a full-time, minimum-wage worker, the loss in
f o od stamp benefits amounts to $3,798. This loss is more than double the
gain from the Clinton increase in the federal wage floor; the combination
of the higher minimum wage and lower food stamps benefits leaves such
families more than $2,100 poore r. For nonimmigrant families with a min-
imum-wage income, the loss in food stamps benefits amounts to a little
over $200. For these families the $0.90 increase in hourly wages pro m i s e d
by the hike in the wage floor ends up being closer to $0.73 after added
FICA taxes and the lost food stamps benefits are deducted.1 1
On top of the food stamp cuts, the EITC program is slated to lose $18.5
billion between now and the year 2002 under the 1996 congre s s i o n a l
budget resolution (Parrott, Super, and Steinmetz 1996). This will be
particularly burdensome, for the stated objective of welfare reform is to
move millions of AFDC families off the public assistance rolls. Forced to
work, many former AFDC recipients will become even more dependent
on food stamps and more families will be eligible for EITC, despite the
legislated cut in the former and the current legislative attempt to reduce
the latter. While wage insurance is an idea whose time has come, the
c u rrent politics of welfare re f o rm and budget cuts suggest that what is
given with one hand (a higher minimum wage) is undercut by what is
taken away with the other (food stamps, EITC).
As is true for any insurance scheme, the ultimate objective should be to
i m p rove conditions so that the insurance is less and less needed.
Improvements in roads and the safety features on motor vehicles should
reduce the cost of auto insurance, a reduction in crime should lower
home insurance premiums, good preventive health care should re d u c e
medical insurance premiums, and equitably distributed rising wages
should reduce both the number of workers forced to rely on the mini-
mum wage floor and the cost of the EITC program. Hence, fashioning a
full employment macro policy should be thought of as part of the overall
approach to wage insurance. Similarly, efforts to improve education and
training programs, expand community economic development eff o rt s ,
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i n c rease unionization, and move toward comparable pay for men and
women can reduce the long-run cost of wage insurance. In the mean-
time, in an era of stagnating wages, increasing income instability, and
rising working-age adult poverty, legitimizing the concept of wage insur-
ance seems to be the next logical step in dealing with important issues of
social equity.
Appendix. How Raising the Minimum Wage and Keeping the
EITC Intact Helps Working Families Put Food on the Ta b l e
Assume a family (Family 1) with two children and one adult earn e r
working 1,500 hours per year at the old ($4.25) minimum wage (see
Table 5). At this wage floor the family would have a total annual income
of just $5,887 (after subtracting its share of FICA taxes), excluding its
EITC. The EITC alone boosts this family’s income to $8,437. Lifting the
minimum wage to $5.15 per hour raises after-tax earnings to $7,027 and
total income to $10,071, even if we take into account the highest possi-
ble hours displacement effect (1.5 percent) due to the boost in the mini-
mum wage. Overall, the family’s income is raised by 71 percent as a
result of the higher minimum wage and the tax credit. Raising the mini-
mum wage boosts family income by $1,140; the increase in EITC bene-
fits due to higher earnings adds another $494. 
Family 2 in Table 5 has two children and one adult earner working 1,500
hours per year at a job that pays $6.00 per hour, more than both the old
and new minimum wages. However, passage of a higher federal wage floor
is expected, using the wage contour estimate of Spriggs and Klein (1994),
to raise this worker’s pay to $6.60 per hour. The increase in the minimum
wage increases family income by $831 net of FICA taxes. Because the
w o r k e r’s earnings fall within the flat part of the EITC schedule, there is
no change in the size of the wage subsidy. Overall, the annual income of
Family 2 is 53 percent higher than it would have been if there were no
EITC and the minimum wage had remained $4.25 an hour.
Family 3, also with two children, has one adult earner working 1,500
hours per year, but at a job that pays $7.00 per hour. We assume no
increase in this wage rate even after the federal minimum is increased.
While the minimum wage has no impact on this family’s income, the
PPB No.28  2/17/99  4:32 PM  Page 29Making Work Pay
Public Policy Brief 30
Table 5 Simulations of Income for Four Families
Family 1. Two children; one adult earner working at minimum wage, 
50 weeks per year, 30 hours per week
Hourly Wage and  Earnings
Hours Worked Earnings after FICA EITC Total
Old minimum wage and no EITC $4.25 x 1,500 hr $6,375 $5,887 $0 $5,887
Old minimum wage and EITC $4.25 x 1,500 hr $6,375 $5,887 $2,550 $8,437
New minimum wage and EITC $5.15 x 1,477.5 hr $7,609 $7,027 $3,044 $10,071 
Increased minimum wage and EITC raises family income by 71 percent after FICA taxes. 
Increased minimum wage adds $1,140 (net of FICA taxes) to family income.
Increased EITC due to higher earnings adds $494 to family income.
Family 2. Two children; one adult earner working at just above minimum wage, 
50 weeks per year, 30 hours per week
Hourly Wage and  Earnings
Hours Worked Earnings after FICA EITC Total
Old minimum wage and no EITC $6.00 x 1,500 hr $9,000 $8,312 $0 $8,312
Old minimum wage and EITC $6.00 x 1,500 hr $9,000 $8,312  $3,560  $11,872
New minimum wage and EITC $6.60 x 1,500 hr $9,900 $9,143  $3,560  $12,703 
Increased minimum wage and EITC raises family income by 53 percent after FICA taxes.
Increase in minimum wage adds $831 (net of FICA taxes) to family income.
Family 3. Two children; one adult earner working at $7.00 per hour, 
50 weeks per year, 30 hours per week
Hourly Wage and  Earnings
Hours Worked Earnings after FICA EITC Total
Old minimum wage and no EITC $7.00 x 1,500 hr $10,500 $9,697 $0  $9,697
Old minimum wage and EITC $7.00 x 1,500 hr $10,500  $9,697  $3,560 $13,257
Increased minimum wage adds no income, but EITC raises family income by 37 percent after
FICA taxes.
(Continued)
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addition of the EITC does. Family 3 is eligible for the maximum EITC
benefit so that its income after FICA taxes is 37 percent higher than it
would be in the absence of the wage subsidy. 
F i n a l l y, we have Family 4, also with two children, but with two adult
earners, each working 1,500 hours per year at the old ($4.25) minimum
wage. Boosting the minimum wage to $5.15 increases family income by
nearly $2,300 net of FICA taxes. In this case, raising the minimum wage
also benefits the federal treasury through savings on EITC. The higher
minimum wage puts Family 4 on the downward-sloping section of the
EITC schedule, resulting in a reduction of $518 in tax credits. The net
increase in family income from raising the federal wage floor is 43 per-
cent, despite the loss of some EITC income. It should be clear fro m
Table 5 that all of these families have improved their incomes substan-
tially because of the combination of an improved minimum wage and the
present EITC program.
Table 5—Continued
Family 4. Two children; two adult earners, each working at minimum wage, 
50 weeks per year, 30 hours per week
Hourly Wage and  Earnings
Hours Worked Earnings after FICA EITC Total
Old minimum wage and no EITC $4.25 x 3,000 hr $12,750 $11,775 $0 $11,775
Old minimum wage and EITC $4.25 x 3,000 hr $12,750 $11,775 $3,323 $15,098
New minimum wage and EITC $5.15 x 2,955 hr $15,218 $14,054 $2,805 $16,859 
Increased minimum wage and EITC raises family income by 43 percent after FICA taxes.
Increase in minimum wage adds $2,279 (net of FICA taxes) to family income.
Increased minimum wage reduces federal government EITC liability by $518.
Note: These simulations assume a 1.5 percent reduction in hours worked for earners working at the mini-
mum wage as a result of raising the minimum wage from $4.25 to 5.15 per hour. They also assume that
workers who are presently earning no more than $1.00 over the new $5.15 minimum wage will receive a 10
percent wage increase as a result of employers’ interest in maintaining wage differentials within the firm.
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1. Weinberg (1995) noted that 1994 marked the first year since records have
been kept when the proportion of people aged 18 to 64 who are poor (11.9
p e rcent) exceeded the pro p o rtion of elderly who are poor (11.7 perc e n t ) .
As late as 1970, the elderly poor proportion was two and a half times the
poverty rate for nonelderly adults.
2. In support of the promise of full employment as an antidote to low wages
and poverty, one can argue that we have not really tried full employment
yet. Millions of new jobs are created every year and the official national
unemployment rate has been below 6 percent for more than two years.
Nonetheless, the argument goes, there is still enormous slack in the labor
market and therefore no real pressure to boost wages. The use of temporary,
part-time, and other contingent workers increases the number of reported
jobs, yet reduces upward pre s s u re of wages. Aaron Bernstein re p o rted in
Business Week (1996) that according to the Conference Board, the national
help-wanted index has risen from its low level during the 1990–1991 reces-
sion, but it is still nearly 25 percent below its 1988 level, when aggregate
unemployment was about equal to today’s 5.6 percent. Bernard Wysocki in
The Wall Street Journal (1995) reports that about a million men aged 25 to
55 left the labor force during 1995 and 1996 and therefore do not show up
in the unemployment statistics at all. Many of these left, often following
l a y o ff from a well-paying job, because they were discouraged by their
employment opportunities. Lester Thurow (1996) has tried to estimate the
“ real” unemployment rate taking into account discouraged workers and
part-timers who desire full-time jobs. His estimates suggest a current “real”
unemployment rate of 14 percent. Hence, we do not know to what extent
real full employment might lift wages. The problem is that no one, surely
not the Federal Reserve Board, is going to promote policies to drive the offi-
cial unemployment rate down much below present levels.
3. Current plans to revamp the welfare system will almost assuredly swell the
ranks of the working poor even further. The bipartisan steamroller to “end
w e l f a re as we know it” has a single, overarching aim: to reduce welfare
dependency by requiring welfare mothers to find work. Already states are
being granted federal waivers to experiment with programs that re q u i re
AFDC mothers to take jobs or lose benefits. In some states, such as
Wisconsin and Massachusetts, the forced entrance of welfare recipients into
the labor market is already under way. Few of these former recipients can
expect to find jobs that pay enough to lift their families out of poverty. 
4. Mishel and Bernstein (1994) show that production and nonsuperv i s o ry
workers make up more than 80 percent of wage and salary workers. The
remaining workers are primarily executives, managers, and the self-
employed.
5 . Note that although the real average income per capita for the bottom
quintile fell by nearly 23 percent between 1973 and 1994, the average
income for households in that quintile fell by “only” 7 percent over a
roughly comparable period. What is responsible for this diff e rence is the
change in household composition in the bottom quintile since the 1970s.
T h e re are fewer one- and two-person elderly households in the quintile
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much more than household income in the bottom quintile.
6. The gains from additional tax revenue and welfare payment reductions will
more than likely offset any increase in state and federal unemployment ben-
efits, even if the minimum wage has some negative employment effect.
7. Monopsony is a market situation in which there is one buyer, in contrast to
a monopoly, in which there is one seller. Monopsony in a labor market may
result from limited job search by workers and not simply from limited num-
bers of potential employers. In a pure monopsonistic labor market, workers
have no power. A single employer—or a group of employers in a situation of
limited employee job search—can force wages down below the workers’
marginal product. The establishment of a minimum wage in this case will
simply shift some of the excess profit from the employer to the workers.
8. A recent study of working welfare mothers by Spalter-Roth, Burr,
Hartmann, and Shaw (1995) shows that low-wage workers change jobs on
average every 14 months. The turnover rate among teenage workers is prob-
ably even higher.
9. While target efficiency is not one of the strengths of the minimum wage,
one should not lose sight of the fact that raising the minimum wage still
p rovides real help to low-income families. According to an Economic
Policy Institute study, 40 percent of the gains from the proposed Clinton
wage hike would go to the poorest 20 percent of working families—those
with annual incomes less than $22,000 in 1993. These are clearly deserving
families, even if only about half this number are below the official poverty
line.
10. The high marginal “tax” rate on the EITC is necessitated by the need to
phase out the EITC for families with two children earning more than
$28,495. A lower benefit reduction rate would extend the EITC to families
with much higher incomes and become prohibitively expensive to the fed-
eral treasury. For example, given the current parameters for the EITC sched-
ule for a family with two children, a phase-out rate of only 15 percent rather
than 21.06 percent would make a family with earnings of up to $35,317 eli-
gible for the EITC. A 10 percent phase-out rate would extend the benefits
of the EITC to families with as much as $47,170 in annual earnings.
11. The minimum wage boost increases the income of a family with a full-time
earner by $1,662 net of increased FICA taxes. The food stamp cut reduces
that family’s net purchasing power by $204. Thus, the $1,800 gross increase
in pay for a full-time worker is offset by $138 in added Social Security taxes
and a legislated $204 cut in food stamps. The net gain is $1,458. The
promise of the increased minimum wage is worth about 81 cents on the dol-
lar! These calculations are based on unpublished statistics from the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities.
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